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The preceding chapters shed new light on  the relevance of Kant’s moral psychology 
– mainly within his own moral theory, but also to contemporary moral psychology. 
In most of these chapters, I buttress the relevance of Kant’s moral psychology by show-
ing that certain subjective conditions of human morality are also required for the adop-
tion of moral maxims of virtue, or the specific moral maxims on which we really act.
Along the way, I have set forth a fuller account of Kant’s conception of virtue. 
According to this account, virtue as moral strength is the proper exercise of our 
capacity for moral self-control at two intimately related levels. Moreover, I have shown 
that moral strength can also be read as an exercise of the capacity for self-control 
that is needed if we are to freely adopt moral maxims in ever new situations, and that 
moral weakness can therefore also be read as a mere lack of moral strength expressed 
at the level of maxim adoption. As I have explained, a similar picture holds for the 
Kantian conscience: it is necessary not only for the evaluation of our own actions but 
also for our approval or disapproval of the incentives on which we have based (or 
will base) our maxims.
Self-control and conscience are necessary conditions of our compelling our-
selves to adopt moral maxims and to act accordingly: they presuppose awareness of the 
moral law and make possible the actual determination of our choices by the moral law. 
Since the moral law is always an imperative for us, these subjective conditions must be 
in place if we are to make the moral law “at the same time subjectively necessitating” 
or “subjectively practical” (LM 28: 258; 28: 317). If these conditions were absent, moral 
imperatives, as objective principles, would not also serve us subjectively as practical 
principles. It is therefore also due to the proper exercise of our capacities for self-control 
and conscience that we can adopt virtuous maxims (our subjective, volitional principles 
of action). As with self-control regarding passions and affects, the self-reflective, moni-
toring activity of conscience can be said to facilitate the adoption of moral maxims.1
But how are we then to distinguish between Kant’s conceptions of self-control 
and conscience? How are we to understand the relationship between these two subjec-
tive conditions, each of which is necessary when it comes to compelling ourselves to 
adopt moral maxims? Here is my brief proposal: by properly exercising our capacity 
for self-control we set ourselves moral ends in ever-new situations, whereas conscience 
facilitates this process of setting ourselves moral ends. Conscience seems to enable this 
process because it stimulates moral feeling, by which we set ourselves particular moral 
ends and actually determine our choices by the moral law. As we have seen, it is also due 
to a well-functioning conscience that we adopt virtuous maxims of ends. Self-control 
therefore presupposes the self-reflective activity of conscience.
1  As we have seen, conscience is also necessary when it comes to evaluating already-adopted maxims, 
but its function in the process of maxim adoption is more important for our present purposes.
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Neither self-control nor conscience is sufficient for adopting moral maxims. 
Moreover, self-control conditions the adoption of moral maxims differently than con-
science does. Whereas conscience warns us that it would be impermissible to let our in-
clinations determine our choices by adopting morally incorrect maxims, via the proper 
exercise of our capacity for self-control we set aside or disregard the influence of sen-
sible impressions – in the first instance, simply in order to prevent affects and passions. 
What is more, by disregarding the influences of all sensible impressions on our minds 
or by abstracting from them, reason controls itself while adopting moral maxims. Self-
control at this level is not only a kind of preparatory work that makes maxim-adoption 
possible but is also directly involved in the adoption of moral maxims.
Accordingly, Kant’s point seems to be that the fulfilment of duties of virtue re-
quires not only that we properly exercise our capacity for conscience but also that we 
properly exercise our capacity for self-control. The latter makes it  possible for us to 
acquire inner freedom, which is “the condition of all duties of virtue” (MM 6: 406). The 
activities of conscience, by which we do not actually set aside sensible influences, do not 
suffice for us to actually determine ourselves to act “from duty”.
Finally, analysis of how these subjective conditions relate to Kant’s idea of purity 
allows us to appreciate not only the full relevance of Kant’s moral psychology but also 
the distinct character of Kant’s conceptions of self-control, moral strength and moral 
weakness. In particular, it  allows us fully to appreciate the novel aspects of these el-
ements of Kantian psychology. In  the absence of this analysis, we might be tempted 
to apply the Aristotelian model of continence to account for Kant’s concepts of moral 
strength and weakness. To the extent that we fail to take into account Kant’s idea of 
purity, we might indeed be tempted to read Kant’s accounts of moral strength and weak-
ness (of the capacity for self-control) in terms of whether or not one is able to compel 
oneself to perform an action that one judges to be morally necessary and has chosen 
independently of one’s capacity for self-control. This move is unacceptable for several 
reasons, however. For one, it reduces Kant’s notion of virtue to a kind of skill needed 
for following already-established maxims, such that we must then account for the fulfil-
ment of duties of virtue in the way that the fulfilment of duties of right can and should 
be accounted for. By claiming that virtue as moral strength is simply about compelling 
ourselves to undertake certain actions in order to adhere to our established maxims, we 
lose a useful tool for explaining the essence of Kantian virtue. In order words, we put 
ourselves in a position of being unable to explain how we compel ourselves to adopt 
virtuous maxims of ends.
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More generally, in taking this route we also lose the opportunity to apply Kant’s 
distinct conceptions to contemporary issues in  moral psychology. As  demonstrated 
above, Kant’s view of conscience is philosophically fruitful when applied to present-day 
debates on the immorality of psychopaths. Kant’s conception of self-control, along with 
its strength and weakness, seems to have similar potential. Analysing self-control as 
the Kantian ability to abstract from different sensible influences sheds new light on the 
ongoing dispute over how self-control and weakness of will are to be understood. It re-
mains to be seen whether this approach to self-control will prove as advantageous as my 
interpretation of Kantian conscience.

